James v. Faltierra: Housing Discrimination
by Referendum?
If the poor want the affluent to provide them with housing, it
would seem only reasonable that they should expect and be willing
to accept the willing consent of a simple majority of those persons
who are expected to help pay ....1
Wherever the real power in a Government lies, there is the
danger of oppression. In our Government the real power lies in
the majority of the Community, and the invasion of private rights
is chiefly to be apprehended, not from acts of Government contrary to the sense of its constituents, but from acts in which the
Government is the mere instrument of the major number of the
constitutents. This is a truth of great importance, but not yet
sufficiently attended to ....
2

In James v. Valtierra3 the United States Supreme Court upheld the
4
constitutionality of article XXXIV of the California Constitution,
1

Brief for Appellants James et al. at 17-18, James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971).

2

5

WRIriNGs OF JAMES MADISON 272 (Hunt ed. 1904).

3 402 US. 137 (1971).

4 CAL. CONST. art. XXXIV, § 1 provides:
No low rent housing project shall hereafter be developed, constructed, or acquired
in any manner by any state public body until, a majority of the qualified electors of
the city, town or county, as the case may be, in which it is proposed to develop,
construct, or acquire the same, voting upon such issue, approve such project by voting
in favor thereof at an election to be held for that purpose, or at any general or special
election.
For the purposes of this article the term "low rent housing project" shall mean any
development composed of urban or rural dwellings, apartments or other living accommodations for persons of low income, financed in whole or in part by the Federal
Government or a state public body, or to which the Federal Government or a state
public body extends assistance by supplying all or part of the labor, by guaranteeing
the payment of liens, or otherwise ....
For the purposes of this article only "persons of low income" shall mean persons
or families who lack the amount of income which is necessary (as determined by the
state public body developing, constructing, or acquiring the housing project) to
enable them, without financial assistance, to live in decent, safe and sanitary dwellings, without overcrowding ....

Apparently only Virginia has a similar law, which provides that the selection of a
low-income public housing site in a city with a population not greater than ninety thousand nor less than seventy thousand shall be subject to a city referendum unless the
project is authorized for the purpose of relocating families displaced by urban renewal.
VA. CODE § 36-19.4 (1950). Alabama law provides that public housing projects may not be
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which requires a local housing authority's selections of low-income
public housing sites to be approved in community referenda.5
In its opinion the Court touched upon three primary issues: (1) the
nature of referenda provisions and the scope of judicial review over
them; (2) almost parenthetically, the effect of the referendum upon
the rights of an economic minority-the poor; and (3) the referendum's
effect upon the rights of racial minorities. The Court broadly endorsed
the referendum and implied that referenda should not be subjected to
a stringent standard of judicial scrutiny. The Court found that the
record would not support the lower court's finding that the provision,
although neutral on its face, imposed increased procedural burdens
upon racial minorities. 6 Although it suggested that the referendum
procedure might disadvantage some persons in the political process, the
Court's majority never explicitly referred to the economic composition of that group which had been singled out for special treatmentlow-income persons who apply for public housing. The Court found,
alienated by the local governing body unless the decision is approved by referendum.
At.A. CODE tit. 47, § 62(1) (1958). Wisconsin law provides that a project may be liquidated
or disposed of by referendum. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 66.40(25)(a) (1957).
5 The origins of article XXXIV can be briefly summarized:
The United States Housing Act of 1937 (42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1401-1430) established a
federal housing agency authorized to make loans to state agencies for the purpose
of slum clearance and low-rent housing projects. The California Legislature made
the benefits of the federal act available to the cities and counties of this state by
enacting the Housing Authorities Law ....
The legislation created in each city and county a public housing authority....
The exercise of the powers entrusted by the Legislature to these agencies was made
subject to the preliminary condition that the local governing body, in each case,
must formally resolve that public housing is needed.
Housing Authority v. Superior Court, 35 Cal. 2d 550, 552-53, 219 P.2d 457, 458 (1950).
In that case the California Supreme Court held that the determination of the housing
authority as to site selection of projects was administrative, not legislative, and thus not
subject to the general nonmandatory referendum provision. This decision was overruled
by article XXXIV, which was adopted in the same year through initiative and referendum.
6 402 U.S. at 141. The lower court opinion is Valtierra v. Housing Authority, 313
F. Supp. I (N.D. Cal. 1970). A curious difference in perspective between the two opinions
is evident. The lower court opinion seems to indicate that the racial and poverty aspects
of the case are inseparable, while the Supreme Court opinion summarily disposes of the
racial aspect of the case and completely ignores the poverty issue. Justice Marshall's
dissent, on the other hand, focuses on the statute's explicit classification on the basis of
wealth but fails to mention the racial aspect of the case.
The term "race" as used herein includes minority groups other than blacks, including
Mexican-Americans, Puerto Ricans, and Indians, all of whom suffer much the same type
of discrimination as does the black man. See, e.g., U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGnTS, MEXICANAMERICAN EDUCATION STUDY 11 (1971): "The Southwest has had a long history of ethnic isolation and segregation of Mexican Americans from the remainder of its society. Although
segregation probably never has been required by statute in any of the five Southwestern
States, it has been practiced not only in the schools of the region, but in other aspects of
life as well."'
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however, that the community's interest in determining the level of
local governmental expenditure and taxation outweighed whatever disadvantages might be incurred by others through the mandatory referendum procedure.
This comment will focus on the three constitutional issues posed
by the Valtierra case: (1) whether the standard of judicial scrutiny of
referendum legislation and decisions is or should be identical to that
which applies to representative legislative enactments; (2) whether
explicit classifications based upon wealth are or should be disfavored
on new or substantive equal protection grounds; and (3)whether the
California provision, although neutral on its face, may have an impermissible racially discriminatory effect-raising the question whether
the Court's opinion in this respect is consistent with such decisions as
Reitman v. Mulkey" and Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority.8
I.

JUDICIAL SCRUTINY OF REFERENDUM LEGISLATION

Initially, it is important to determine whether the presumed validity
of challenged legislation is affected by the manner in which it is enacted-by the people themselves or by the people's representatives. 9
The majority of the Valtierra Court appear to have believed that
referendum legislation and decision making occupy a special place in
the political process so as to merit a greater presumption of validity
than that which attaches to representative legislation. The Court emphasized that the referendum is a "procedure for democratic decisionmaking" and that "provisions for referendums demonstrate devotion
to democracy, not to bias, discrimination, or prejudice."'1
As the following discussion shows, such a blanket endorsement is
inconsistent not only with standards previously announced by the
Court, but also with the fourteenth amendment's protection of minorities against unrestrained majority will."
7 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
8 296 F. Supp. 907, 304 F. Supp. 736 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
9 In Housing Authority v. Superior Court, 35 Cal. 2d 550, 219 P.2d 457 (1950), the court
held that the decision of the housing authority as to site selection was administrative,
not legislative, and thus not subject to the existing referendum provision. The court
stated that the California statute setting up local housing authorities "expressly recognizes
the existence of slum and substandard living areas and enunciates the government's
intent to eliminate them," id. at 553, 219 P.2d at 458, and, quoting Kleiber v. City and
County of San Francisco, 18 Cal. 2d 718, 724, 117 P.2d 657, 660 (1941), that "'the subject
matter of the action is of more than local concern,'" id. at 558, 219 P.2d at 461.
10 402 U.S. at 141.
11 See Lucas v. Colorado General Assembly, 377 US. 713, 736-37 (1964). Other courts
have gone so far as to enjoin the submission of certain proposals to public referenda
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Perhaps the Court's most instructive statement on referendum legislation came in Lucas v. Colorado General Assembly.' 2 Two amendments to the Colorado Constitution had been proposed by initiative.
The first proposal provided for one-man, one-vote representation in
both houses of the state legislature, while the second provided for
one-man, one-vote representation in the more numerous house only.
The second proposal was approved in a public referendum. Against
claims that the measure violated the fourteenth amendment, the district court upheld its constitutionality, explaining that it was precluded from reversing the people's judgment rendered in accordance
with Colorado's liberal provisions for citizen participation in the governmental process. 13 Faced with the unusual situation of a majority of
the electorate denying itself equal representation in both houses of
the state legislature, the Supreme Court disapproved the plan, stating
that a majority may not, through a public referendum, infringe upon
a citizen's constitutional rights. 14
Lucas, therefore, appears to stand for the principle that when the
people act as a legislative body in a referendum, the Constitution imposes upon them the same responsibilities as it imposes upon a representative legislature, and that voter legislation, even if it does
"demonstrate devotion to democracy,"' 15 or citizen majority rule, is not
given any greater presumption of validity for that reason.
For the Valtierra Court to extol in unqualified fashion the virtues of
the referendum was thus unnecessary and misleading. Moreover, apart
from Lucas, it may have cast doubt upon a basic principle of Hunter
v. Erickson 6 -that "a State may distribute legislative powers as it
desires and that the people may retain for themselves the power over
certain subjects may generally be true, but [that] these principles
furnish no justification for a legislative structure which would otherWise violate the Fourteenth Amendment. Nor does the implementation
1
of this change through popular referendum immunize it."'
because the effect of the submission itself was prohibited by the fourteenth amendment.
In Holmes v. Leadbetter, 294 F. Supp. 991 (E.D. Mich. 1968), and Otey v. Common Council,
281 F. Supp. 264 (E.D. Wis. 1968), submission of open housing referendum proposals
to the electorate was held to be within the "encouragement" prohibition of Reitman v.
Mulkey, 387 U.S. 69 (1967), For a discussion of the Reitman decision, see text at notes
109-24 infra.
12 377 U.S. 713 (1964).
1s Lisco v. Love, 219 F. Supp. 922, 932-33 (D. Colo. 1963), rev'd sub nom. Lucas v.
Colorado General Assembly, 877 US. 713 (1964).
14 377 U.S. at 786-37.
15 402 U.S. at 141.
16 393 US. 385 (1969).
17 Id. at 392.
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II.

VALMmTy OF EXPLICIT CLASSIFICATIONS BASED UPON WEALTH

Any discussion of the validity of classifications based upon wealth
under the new or substantive equal protection doctrine is difficult

and somewhat speculative in the context of Valtierra because the
Court's opinion failed to address that question. Justice Black ignored
not only the points raised by Justice Marshall in his dissent' 8 but also
those cases in which the Court has stated that classifications based upon
wealth, like those based upon race, are "suspect."' 9 In view of the
exclusive applicability of the California referendum provision to lowincome housing projects, an examination of the Court's opinion in
terms of both the new and the old equal protection doctrines appears
to be warranted.
A. Equal Protection-Old and New
The old and new equal protection doctrines, the subject of wide
debate and discussion in recent years, 20 require only brief summarization. Under the old equal protection, legislative classifications are
allowed a strong presumption of validity and are constitutionally permissible if "rationally related to a legitimate governmental objective." 21 The contrast with the new equal protection is striking. In
recent years the Court has indicated that the new equal protection
encompasses two primary branches, fundamental rights22 and suspect
criteria. While the suspect category was initially limited to racial
criteria,23 the Court's recent decisions have suggested that classifica18 402 U.S. at 145. Justice Marshall stated that "[i]t is far too late in the day to contend
that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits only racial discrimination; and to me, singling
out the poor to bear a burden not placed on any other class of citizens tramples the
values that the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to protect." Justices Brennan and
Blackmun concurred in the dissent. Justice Douglas took no part in the case.
19 See e.g., McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'nrs, 394 U.S. 802, 807 (1969); Harper
v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353,

355-58 (1963).
20 See, e.g., Black, The Supreme Court, 1966 Term, Foreword: "State Action", Equal
Protection and California's Proposition 14, 81 HAv. L. REv. 69, 96-99 (1967); Karst &
Horowitz, Reitman v. Mulkey: A Telophase of Substantive Equal Protection, 1967 Sup. Cr.
Rv. 39; Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term, Foreword: On Protecting the Poor
Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARv. L. Rrv. 7 (1969); Sager, Tight Little
Islands: Exclusionary Zoning, Equal Protection and the Indigent, 21 STN. L. REv. 767
(1969); Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HAIv. L. REv. 1065 (1969).
21 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 658 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
22 See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968);
Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
23 See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964);
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
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tions based upon wealth are also included.24 When either a suspect
criterion has been incorporated into a statute or the exercise of a
fundamental right is threatened, the statutory classification must be
justified by a "compelling governmental interest." 25
Application of the new equal protection doctrine involves close
"judicial scrutiny" 26 imposing upon the state a heavy burden of
justification.27 Concomitantly, the Court has sometimes considered
whether there are alternatives available to the state by which it can
achieve its legitimate objective without substantial infringement upon
fundamental rights or without classification by means of suspect
criteria.28 If the Court finds a "less onerous alternative" by which a
state is able to achieve its legitimate objective, the state may not
employ a method which, though rationally related to that objective,
29
more substantially infringes upon protected rights.
B.

Wealth as a Suspect Criterion
The majority in Valtierra, while noting that classifications based
upon race are constitutionally suspect, ignored the Court's previous
statements that classifications based upon wealth also fall within the
suspect category: "Lines drawn on the basis of wealth, like those of
24 See cases cited note 19 supra. Justice Harlan's dissent in Shapiro v. Thompson, 394
U.S. 618, 658, succinctly summarized what he perceived to be the trend of the Court's decisions in this area:
In upholding the equal protection argument, the Court has applied an equal protection doctrine of relatively recent vintage: the rule that statutory classifications which
either are based upon certain "suspect" criteria or affect "fundamental rights" will
be held to deny equal protection unless justified by a "compelling" governmental
interest. The "compelling interest" doctrine, which today is articulated more explicitly
than ever before, constitutes an increasingly significant exception to the long-established rule that a statute does not deny equal protection if it is rationally related to
a legitimate governmental objective.
Justice Harlan's earlier view of the Court's trend is quite different, as expressed in his
dissent in Cardona v. Power, 384 U.S. 672, 660-61 (1966):
It is suggested that a different and broader equal protection standard applies where
"fundamental liberties and rights are threatened," ... which would require a state
to show a need greater than mere rational policy to justify classifications in this
area. No such dual-level test has ever been articulated by this Court, and I do not
believe any such approach is consistent with . ..

the Equal Protection Clause ....

25 Cf. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969). See also Sherbert v. Verner, 374
U.S. 398, 406 (1963); Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960); Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
26 McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802, 807 (1969). For views regarding the content of the concept of "close judicial scrutiny," the point of departure for
application of the new equal protection standard, see Karst & Horowitz, supra note 20;
Michelman, supra note 20; Sager, supra note 20.
27 See cases cited note 25 supra; Michelman, supra note 20, at 20.
28 See Tate v. Short, 91 S. Ct. 668 (1971); Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967);
Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965).
20 Cf. Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965).
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race . . . are traditionally disfavored. ' 8 0 "[C]areful examination on
our part is especially warranted where lines are drawn on the basis
of wealth or race, .

.

. two factors which would independently render

a classification highly suspect and thereby demand a more exacting
31
judicial scrutiny."
The cases in which the Court has invalidated statutes containing
classifications based upon wealth have also involved barriers hindering
the indigent in the exercise of certain fundamental rights, sometimes
formulated for the first time in those cases. 32 In such decisions the
question whether wealth, as a suspect criterion, formed an independent
basis for the determination of constitutional invalidity or was merely
an ancillary consideration has never been expressly resolved. Justice
Harlan indicated, however, that the criterion of wealth may have
provided an independent basis for invalidation when he stated that
"[the criterion of 'wealth' apparently was added to the list of 'suspects'
as an alternative justification for the rationale in Harper v. Virginia
Bd. of Elections .

. . ."33

On the other hand, it has been forcefully

argued that because fundamental rights of voting and access to the
judicial process in criminal cases were involved, the finding of a
suspect criterion was unnecessary to the decision.34 Inability to pay a
fee had no reasonable relationship to a proper governmental objective
and, in addition, a pecuniary burden on the exercise of those fundamental rights might have been invalidated under the due process
clause.
McDonald v. Board of Election Commissioners,35 however, has
30 Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966).
31 McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802, 807 (1969) (emphasis added).
32 See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (access to court for divorce proceedings); Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970) (imprisonment for longer than maximum
statutory sentence for nonpayment of fine); Roberts v. LaVallee, 389 U.S. 40 (1967) (transcript of preliminary hearing for use at trial); Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967)
(effective advocacy by court-appointed counsel); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963)
(counsel on first appeal from conviction); Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708 (1961) (filing
fee for application for writ of habeas corpus); Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959) (filing fee
for motion for leave to appeal); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (trial transcript for
appeal).
33 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 658-59 (1969) (dissenting opinion).
34 However, even one skeptical of the proposition that such cases make the poor a
judicially favored class under the new equal protection admits that "[h]eightened judicial
skepticism about statutes which explicitly isolate an economic class for special treatmenti.e., the cases 'where lines are drawn on the basis of wealth'--is . . . obviously justified."
Michelman, supra note 20, at 26-27.
35 394 U.S. 802 (1969). The Court upheld the validity of an absentee ballot statute
which had the effect of preventing inmates awaiting trial in Cook County Jail who were
residents of Cook County from obtaining absentee ballots while inmates who were
residents of other counties could do so.
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drawn into question this restrictive explanation of the cases involving
the poor. Presented with an equal protection challenge to a state
absentee ballot procedure, the Court deferred its discussion of the
merits of the case until it determined "how stringent a standard to
use in evaluating the classifications made [by the statute] and whether
the distinctions must be justified by a compelling state interest." 36 The
Court stated that the exacting standards of the new equal protection
would be applied if the statute involved a classification "drawn on the
37
basis of wealth or race."
The analytical approach of McDonald, under which the standard
for testing the classification is determined before the substantive issues
in the case are decided, was not followed in Valtierra, which the
Court decided without specifying which equal protection standard it
was applying. The Court thus avoided the question whether a classification based upon wealth, like a racial classification, provides an
independent basis for application of the new equal protection. Until
Valtierra, as noted, the cases afforded sound reason to believe that
classifications based upon wealth are within the suspect category. These
precedents were emphasized in Justice Marshall's dissenting opinion,
but the Court failed to respond to them. Through its silence, the
Court obscured the developing clarification of a constitutional prin38
ciple and thereby invited conflicting lower court interpretations.
Assimilation of a prohibition of classifications based upon wealth to
the prohibition of racial classifications cannot be accomplished in an
unquestioned fashion, notwithstanding one court's succinct rationale
for constructing an analogy between the two criteria. In Hobson v.
Hansen3 9 Judge Wright explained that although the judiciary usually
defers to administrative and legislative resolutions of confficting interests, its faith in the justice of such resolutions is often misplaced
when the interests of the poor or racial minority groups are involved.
A closer judicial scrutiny of judgments adverse to the interests of
these groups is necessary because they "are not always assured of a
full and fair hearing through the ordinary political processes, not
so much because of outright bias, but because of the abiding danger
that the power structure

. . .

may incline to pay little heed to even

at 806.
at 807.
38 The confusion to which the Valtierra Court has exposed lower courts was apparent
in the recent decision of Serrano v. Priest, - Cal. 3d -, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601
(1971). There the California Supreme Court held the state school-financing scheme unconstitutional on equal protection grounds.
39 269 F. Supp. 401, 507 (D.D.C. 1967).
36 Id.
37 Id.

1971]

Housing Discrimination by Referendum?

the deserving interests of a politically voiceless and invisible minority."40 There are major obstacles, however, to the assimilation of

wealth to race as a suspect criterion: the positive value society places
upon distinctions of wealth, the tradition of state-imposed financial
prerequisites for the enjoyment of certain services and activities, the
belief that poverty is remediable, the difficulty of determining what
constitutes poverty, and, finally, the difficulty of defining the limits on
the substantive areas to which the new equal protection should apply.41
Despite these obstacles, there are reasons why the poor, like raciil
minorities, should be afforded special judicial treatment under the
new equal protection. The poor are increasingly comprised of particular racial and ethnic minority groups, 42 so that economic discrimination may be merely a guise for racial discrimination.43 Moreover,
at 507-08.
See Sager, supra note 20, at 785-87. As Professor Sager notes, race is not a valid

40 Id.
41

consideration in determining access to housing, employment opportunities, and places of
public accomodation and amusement. It is a far different matter to suggest, however, that
wealth should not be a determinative factor. No man is entitled to a twenty thousand
dollar home; to a higher salary; or to free admission to hotels, restaurants, and theaters
because he is poor. The state charges all persons equally for use of toll roads and universities; for fishing, hunting, and driver's licenses; and more. Because wealth, in contrast
to race, is a relative factor, the income level at which a person is entitled to state-provided
services is largely discretionary, although qualifying standards which are particularly
arbitrary may be effectively challenged. Finally, because poverty, unlike race, is considered
remediable, one might be less concerned with the adverse effects of distinctions drawn on
the basis of wealth.

42 313 F. Supp. at 5.
In 1967, 41 percent of the nonwhite population was poor, compared with 12 percent
of the white population. Nonwhites thus constitute a far larger share of the poverty

population (31 percent) than of the American population as a whole (12 percent).
Moreover, the nonwhite proportion of the poverty population has been increasing

slowly but steadily, since the first racial count was made in 1959; it was 28 percent
then, and 32 percent by 1967.
NATIONAL COMM'N ON URBAN PROBLEMS, BUILDING

THE AMERICAN CITY, H.R. Doc. No. 91-

34, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 45 (1968).
43 See Fiss, A Theory of Fair Employment Laws, 38 U. CH. L. Rnv. 235, 296 (1970);
text at notes 95-96 infra. In his discussion of the theory of functional equivalence, Professor Fiss states:
The question then is whether the reach of the antidiscrimination prohibition has
been exhausted, and three factors may justify a second look at the criterion: evasion,
unfair treatment, and the impact of the criterion on the equal-achievement goal.
The first factor-evasion-[is rooted in a concern that a person will try] . . . to
satisfy his taste for discrimination . . . by using a criterion which does not mention
race but which accomplishes precisely the same result ....
Second, an attempt to reach the seemingly innocent criterion may be rooted in a
concern for fair treatment of Negroes. It is thought just as unfair to judge a Negro
on the basis of such a criterion as it is to judge him on the basis of race . . . . Of
course, it may be unfair to judge anyone, white or black, on the basis of such a
criterion; but this does not lessen the unfairness when Negroes are judged by such a
criterion ....

A third source of concern relates to the goal of improving the relative economic
positions of blacks.
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it is superficial to assume that poverty is easily overcome-particularly
by members of racial minority groups, for whom residential segregation is a substantial hindrance. And as affluent Americans migrate
to the suburbs, the poor-particularly those of racial minority groups
-increasingly inhabit decaying urban centers. 44 The consequent decline in tax receipts in urban areas causes a corresponding decline
in the quality of municipal services-particularly education, an important prerequisite to employment. The isolation of the poor is
exacerbated by the reduction of employment opportunities caused by
the flow to the suburbs of commercial and industrial facilities,45 a
phenomenon which further decreases urban tax receipts and aids in
perpetuating a cycle of poverty. While this trend might be counteracted by locating low-income housing in areas of growing employment opportunities and better educational facilities, the referendum
provision in Valtierra permits wealthy suburban escapees to veto lowincome housing on the apparent grounds of minimizing municipal
expenditures and taxation. If such housing is to be built at all, it must
46
apparently be located in the decaying central cities.
C.

Application of the Suspect Criterion of Wealth

Article XXXIV of the California Constitution makes an explicit,
de jure classification based upon wealth; 47 for, as Justice Marshall
pointed out, "[p]ublicly assisted housing developments designed to
accommodate the aged, veterans, state employees, persons of moderate
income, or any class of citizens other than the poor, need not be
approved by prior referenda." ' 48 Although the Valtierra Court did not
44 See Sloane, Toward Open Adequate Housing: The 1968 Housing Act: Best Yet-But
Is It Enough?, 1 Civ. R GrTs DIG., No. 3, at 1, 4-5 (1968).
45 The fact is that an ever-increasing number of industrial concerns and businesses
are locating plants in suburban areas. The Bureau of Labor Statistics has reported
that for the period 1960-1967, sixty-two per cent of all industrial buildings and
fifty-two per cent of all commercial buildings were constructed outside the central
cities of metropolitan areas. Moreover, more than fifty per cent of all new jobs created
in the 1960's in the standard metropolitan areas were outside the central city.
Note, Snob Zoning: Must a Man's Home Be a Castle?, 69 MicH. L. REv. 339, 340 (1970),
citing BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, CHANGES IN URBAN AAIERICA 1-5

(BLS Rep. No. 353, 1969).
46 The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights found last year that of the quarter of a
million low-rent housing units that have been built by city public housing authorities
in the Nation's 24 largest metropolitan areas, in only one--Cincinnati-has the city
housing authority been permitted to build outside the central city. There, the
authority has provided a total of 76 low-rent units in a Negro enclave in the suburbs.
Sloane, supra note 44, at 3.
47 Most commentators have limited their discussions of the "classifications based upon
wealth" standard to de facto classifications, apparently assuming that a de jure classification would be invalid. See, e.g., Michelman, supra note 20; Sager, supra note 20.
.
48 402 US. at 144 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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state clearly what standard it applied in determining the validity of
article XXXIV, it is instructive to analyze the case first in terms of
the new equal protection standard.
Assuming wealth is a suspect criterion, the California referendum
could have been upheld only were the state able to demonstrate a
compelling interest to justify the provision. In its best light, the
referendum may be characterized as a measure directed primarily at
minimization of municipal expenditures and taxation. The Supreme
Court has held, however, that a state interest in saving money is not
compelling when it infringes upon the exercise of fundamental rights.
In Shapiro v. Thompson4 the Court invalidated a one-year residence
requirement for welfare benefits eligibility because it created an
"invidious classification" in violation of the equal protection clause,
infringing upon the fundamental right to travel interstate. The state
attempted to justify the statutory classifications on the grounds that
the residence requirement was "a protective device to preserve the
fiscal integrity of state public assistance programs" and "an attempt to
distinguish between new and old residents on the basis of the contribution they have made to the community through the payment of
taxes." 50 The Court firmly rejected both arguments, finding that such
"reasoning would logically permit the State to bar new residents from
schools, parks, and libraries, or deprive them of police and fire protection" and "would permit the State to apportion all benefits according
to the past tax contributions of its citizens." 5' Although the Court
recognized the legitimacy of a state purpose to limit expenditures and
taxation, the method chosen was void because "saving of welfare costs
cannot justify an otherwise invidious classification." 5 2
The arguments of the Valtierra appellants are barely distinguishable from those of the Shapiro appellants-that indigents should be
barred from residing in a particular area because their contributions to
its tax base would be insufficient to cover the additional governmental
expenditures entailed by such residence. Since a municipality is a
branch of the state, it reasonably follows that saving money is not a
compelling interest even when a community relies upon it to justify
barring indigents from residing therein in public housing.5 3 And if
49 394 U.S. 618 (1969).

50 Id. at 627, 632.
51 Id. at 632-33.
52 Id. at 633.
53 In a different context, a lower federal court has held that municipal services must
be apportioned equally among members of the community. In Hawkins v. Town of Shaw,

437 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971), the plaintiffs alleged racial discrimination in the apportionment of municipal benefits and services. Although the court found no evidence that local
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such an interest is not compelling under the fundamental right branch
of the new equal protection, it is doubtful that it is compelling under
the suspect criterion branch.
Moreover, had the "less onerous alternative" doctrine been considered in Valtierra, the Court may have found that other methods
exist whereby California could achieve its objective of minimizing
financial hardships incurred by particular communities through the
location of low-income public housing sites. The state legislature
could, for example, distribute the present burden on local finances by
providing communities that have public housing with state grants
equal to the difference between the amount the community would
have received through taxation of the project at full value and the
amount received under existing statutes, which appropriate ten percent of the project's rental monies to the community.
D.

Application of the Old Equal Protection Standard

The remaining question is whether article XXXIV is valid under
the old equal protection standard-whether the classification made is
"rationally related to a legitimate governmental objective. 5 4
First, the purpose of article XXXIV must be shown to be permissible. In Valtierra, there is a question as to what the purpose is. While
providing local communities with a determinative voice in government spending appears to be a permissible purpose, barring indigents
unable to assume their proportionate share of the tax burden appears
to be impermissible in the light of Shapiro.55 Second, even if it is
assumed that cost minimization is the purpose underlying article
XXXIV, the mandatory referendum provision may still not satisfy
the rational relation test because the category singled out for prior
approval may be underinclusive. As the Supreme Court has indicated,
the line between rational and irrational is fine. In Rinaldi v. Yeager 58
the Court invalidated a state requirement that an unsuccessful appellant repay the cost of a state-provided transcript. The statute, which
applied only to guilty defendants incarcerated after appeal but not to
officials had been racially motivated in the distribution of these services, the fact that
nearly all municipal improvements had been made in the wealthier, white sections of town
to the neglect of the poorer, black sections was sufficient to bring the conduct within the
prohibition of the equal protection clause.
54 294 U.S. at 658. (Harlan, J., dissenting).
55 394 U.S. at 633. In concluding its analysis of the state's fiscal integrity argument,
the Court said that "neither deterrence of indigents from migrating to the State nor

limitation of welfare benefits to those regarded as contributing to the State is a constitutionally permissible state objective."
-A! 384.U.S. 305 (1966)..
.
.
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those receiving suspended sentences or probation, was held to constitute an invidious discrimination in violation of the equal protection
clause. While the purpose of the statute was to reimburse the state,
the Court stated that the equal protection clause "require[s] that, in
defining a class subject to legislation, the distinctions that are drawn
have 'some relevance to the purpose for which the classification is
made.' -57 Apparently determining that the statutory classification was
underinclusive, the Court found that "no defensible interest [was]
served by focusing on that distinction as a classifying feature in a
reimbursement statute, since it bears no relationship whatever to the
5' s
purpose of the repayment provision.
Whether the classification in article XXXIV is more relevant to the
purpose of the statute than the classification struck down in Rinaldi
is arguable. The determination of rationality appears to involve two
considerations directed to the question of underinclusiveness: the
extraordinary character of mandatory referenda and the subject matter
of the statute-in this instance, low-income public housing. Despite
California's long history of referenda, 59 few subjects have been deemed
sufficiently important to require mandatory referenda. Furthermore,
no other mandatory referendum provision has singled out a particular
0 Whether the Rinaldi standard
economic group to bear its burden.A
requires a determination of irrationality seems to depend upon
whether municipal expenditures would have to be increased without
commensurate increase of tax revenues from other types of housing
developments for which referenda are not required. 61 Thus, if com57 Id.
58 Id.

at 309.

59 402 US. at 141. In its discourse about the democratic referendum procedure, the
Court added one puzzling suggestion. It implied that the validity of the challenged
referendum provision was attributable, in part, to California's long history of referenda.
As a constitutional principle this cannot withstand analysis. Should an identical constitutional amendment be enacted in another state lacking California's history of referenda,
the absence of previous provisions of a similar nature should not be viewed as grounds
for constitutional invalidity. Redress from infringement of important constitutional rights
should not turn on such historical accidents.
60 The Court in Valtierra mentioned four types of referenda. State constitutional
amendments are permissible since the constitution is adopted by the voters initially and
any changes in it should be subject to their approval. Municipal bond referenda are,
under Shapiro, a permissible method of adjusting the level of municipal expenditures as
long as the benefit or hardship is evenly distributed. Territorial annexations permit selfdetermination by persons residing in an area sought to be annexed by a neighboring
municipality. And legislation first enacted by voter initiative, unless repealable only by
referendum, would be subject to repeal by the state legislature immediately after enactment. The subject matter of each of these provisions, however, is clearly different from
that of article XXXIV.
61 Itshould be noted that some low-income public housing is not subject to referenda.
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munities permit the construction of other types of housing, or perhaps of other types of land use, which are either exempt from local
taxation or which do not make a fair contribution to the tax base, the
Rinaldi test of rationality may not be met.

Perhaps, as Justice Black warned in the majority opinion, to invalidate article XXXIV would presumably mean that a community could
not adopt a referendum procedure on any subject unless it submitted
all subjects to referenda. 62 Valtierra can be distinguished, however,
since the provision challenged in that case singles out a particular
economic group which alone has to bear the special procedural burden
of a referendum. Of course, it is possible that the referendum provision
is not arbitrary because it may reflect a careful determination by the
community that the benefits provided by other kinds of tax-exempt
land uses and housing uniformly outweigh any additional costs imposed, 63 but no such calculation was demonstrated by the state.
Nevertheless, certain policy considerations may lend support to the
Court's decision in Valtierra. The construction of low-income public
housing compels the community to subsidize the project through the
The referendum procedure is required only for housing units owned by the local housing
authority, not for units leased from private landlords nor for certain types of replacement
units for persons displaced by a highway project. 51 Op. CAL. ATr'y GEN. 245 (1968); id.
at 42; see Note, Racial Discrimination in Public Housing Site Selection, 23 STAN. L. REV.
63, 66 (1970). In addition, the program authorized by section 23 of the Housing and Urban
Development Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1421b(f) (1970), "does not constitute . . .a 'low-rent
housing project,' as that term is used in article XXXIV of the State Constitution," so that
no prior approval at an election is required. 47 Op. CAL. AT-r'v GEN. 17, 18 (1966). It would
seem that under section 23, units rented from private landlords by the local housing authority are not tax-exempt as are publicly owned housing projects under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1410(h) (1970).
Moreover, in California a variety of land uses are exempt from local taxation but are
not subject to referenda. See, e.g., CAL. CONsr. art. XIII, § 1; CAL. Rxv. & TAX. CODE § 202
(public libraries and free museums); CAL. CONSr. art. XIII, § l(a); CAL. Rrv. & TAX. CODE
§§ 202-03 (Deering 1958) (colleges, including college housing, and public schools); CAL.
CONST. art. XIII, § 1(c); CAL. Ray. & TAx. CODE § 214 (Deering 1958) (property used exclusively for religious, scientific, hospital, or charitable purposes); CAL. CONsr. art. XIII,
§ 1 ; CAL. Ruv. & TAX. CODE §§ 206, 206.1 (Deering 1958) (church property); CAL. CONSr.
art. XIII, § 1234; CAL. REv. & TAx. CODE § 211 (Deering 1958) (land used for young grape
vines and fruit- and nut-bearing trees). Many of the foregoing land uses directly impose
additional costs upon the community, and all indirectly impose such costs by removal of
land from possible uses, such as factories, from which localities could reap high property
tax revenues.
62 402 U.S. at 142.
63 42 US.C. § 1410(h) (1970). The public housing authority does give the local community in which a project is located ten percent of its rentals. In addition, the authority
must pay for any "municipal services" performed by private parties for which other
members of the community must pay a fee. Jersey City Sewerage Authority v. Housing
Authority, 40 N.J. 145, 190 A.2d 870 (1963).
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imposition of higher taxes or by a decline in the level of municipal
services. Although public housing projects can significantly dilute the
tax base, Shapiro indicates that apportionment of municipal services in
accordance with individual contribution is impermissible. However,
because the community's residents must bear an extra financial burden,
it may seem only fair to allow them to have an influence in determining whether or not to undertake that burden.
III.

DETERMINATION OF AN IMPLICIT RACIAL CLASSIFICATION

From the time it was determined both judicially and legislatively
that race was an impermissible criterion in the wholly private housing
market,64 the question of illegal racial discrimination in housing has
become more subtle. The present concern is that exclusion of blacks
from white residential areas may be accomplished "by using a criterion
which does not mention race but which accomplishes precisely the
same result .. ."65
The Valtierra Court, in addressing itself to the question whether an
implicit racial classification is contained within the "benign" criterion
of wealth in article XXXIV, found that "the record here would not
support any claim that a law seemingly neutral on its face is in fact
aimed at a racial minority,"0 0 citing Gomillion v. Lightfoot.67 This
finding merits closer consideration.
A.

Motive or Effect
If a statute is "neutral on its face," 68 the question immediately arises
how a court should determine whether the "seemingly innocent
criterion" 69 or an impermissible criterion is the real basis of a statutory classification. There are two ways in which a court can make this
determination-by focusing on the motives of the persons who made
the decision or by focusing on the effect of the decision.
64 Jones v. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968), construing 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970), 42
U.S.C. §§ 3601-31 (Supp. V, 1969). The state was earlier forbidden to use race as a
criterion in regulating the housing market. See, e.g., Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948);
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); City of Richmond v. Deans, 281 U.S. 704 (1930);
Harmon v. Tyler, 273 U.S. 668 (1926); Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917). This is
not to suggest that the question in Valtierra is one of private discrimination, but rather
that the difficulty of detecting discrimination in Valtierra is similar.
65 Fiss, supra note 43, at 296.
66 402 U.S. at 141.
07 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
08 402 U.S. at 141.
609Fiss, The Charlotte-Mecklenberg Case-Its Significance for Northern School Desegregation, 38 U. CHI. L. REv. 697 (1971).
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suggests that

it was concerned not with any racially discriminatory effect which
article XXXIV might have but rather with the motives of the voters in
enacting the referendum provision. This suggestion is fortified by the
Court's statement that "[p]rovisions for referendums demonstrate devotion to democracy, not to bias, discrimination, or prejudice."7 1 This
emphasis on the virtues of referenda raises questions regarding the
propriety and wisdom of a motive test, particularly in the context of
community approval of proposed public housing sites.
Among the members of the Court and its critics, there are adherents
of the motive test as well as of the effect test 7 2 Yet when the Court
has been directly confronted with the motive-or-effect distinction in
the determination of the constitutional validity of statutes, the majority
of its members have opted for the effect test. Thus, in United States v.
O'Brien73 the Court rejected motive as a possible basis of statutory
invalidity and interpreted Gomillion as standing "not for the proposition that legislative motive is a proper basis for declaring a statute
unconstitutional, but that the inevitable effect of a statute on its face
may render it unconstitutional. . . .[T]he purpose of the legislation
was irrelevant, because the inevitable effect-the 'necessary scope and
operation' . . . -abridged constitutional rights." 74 And in Norris v.
Alabama,75 the Court inferred from jury selection data that a racial
criterion had been used in the selection procedure. The good motives and good faith to which the administrators testified apparently
made no difference. Finally, in Palmerv. Thompson,76 decided shortly
after Valtierra, the Court again confronted the motive-or-effect distinction. It upheld a city council's decision to close all segregated
402 U.S. at 141.
Id.
72 In Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971), the most recent case in which the
Court confronted the issue whether motive or effect is the proper test for determining
racial discrimination, Chief Justice Burger and Justices Black, Blackmun, Douglas, Harlan,
and Stewart favored the effect test while Justices White, Brennan, and Marshall preferred
the motive test. For views of other commentators, see notes 43, 69 supra and note 83 infra.
'7 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
74 Id. at 384-85.
75 294 U.S. 587 (1935). The Court's approach in Norris should be contrasted with that
in Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886), in which the Court did not infer from the
data presented merely that the basis of classification in the statute's administration was
race. Rather, the Court also inferred a motive of racial animus. Although under the
particular circumstances of that case the inference may not have been mere speculation, it
would have been equally consistent with the effect of the state's actions had the motive
been a desire to assist white laundry operators rather than racial animus.
76 403 U.S. 217 (1971).
70
71
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swimming pools after a federal district court had found that segregated municipal facilities constituted a denial of equal protection.
In seeking to have the pools reopened on an integrated basis, the
plaintiffs charged that the council's decision to close the pools rather
than to integrate them had been motivated by racial animosity. While
acknowledging that evidence supported the charge, the Court stated
that "no case in this Court has held that a legislative act may violate
equal protection solely because of the motivations of the men who
' 7 The Court admitted that language
voted for it."
in some of its
78
opinions suggests that motive is a relevant consideration in the determination of constitutionality but added that "the focus in those
cases was on the actual effect of the enactments, not upon the motiva79
tion which led the States to behave as they did."
Both the O'Brien and Palmer decisions articulated several reasons for preferring the effect test to the motive test. A judicial determination of motive or a collection of motives would be a difficult, if
not impossible, task. Moreover, if the Court did find an impermissible
motive and voided a statute on that basis, it would be a Pyrrhic victory
because the statute "would presumably be valid as soon as the legislature or relevant governing body repassed it for different reasons." 0
Finally, it would be dysfunctional to void a statute which had a
legitimate result simply because of the bad motives of those who
enacted it. To these considerations can be added the fact that the legal
system is usually concerned about racial discrimination only -when it
appears that the alleged wrong has actually disadvantaged blacks, not
when the complaint consists merely of an awareness that someone is
thinking bad thoughts about blacks. That is, "[a]ntidiscrimination
prohibitions try to regulate by prohibiting the use of a criterion (race),
and generally a violation of the prohibition does not turn on the
motives or reason for the choice of the criterion."8 1
The preference for the effect test has not gone unchallenged. Justice
White, in his dissent in Palmer, -argued -that the swimming pools
should be reopened on an integrated basis because their closing had
been racially motivated.82 The view that motive may be a valid con77 Id. at 224.
78 The Court mentioned Griffin v. County School Board, 377 U.S. 218 (1964), and

Gomillion v. Ligftfootf 364 U.. S339; 347-(160_.79 403 U.S. at 225.
80 Id.
81 Fiss, supra note 43, at 298.
82 In the O'Brien decision, however, both Justices Brennan and White joined in the
Court's holding that effect, not motive, was the proper test. Justice Marshall did not
take part in that decision.
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sideration has received support from other critics as well. 83 It has been
forcefully argued that the usual guidelines for the determination of
constitutional validity are inadequate in certain situations. According
to this theory, in certain "discretionary" legislative decisions, notably
spending and taxing, a plaintiff alleging racial discrimination must
show that he was disadvantaged by the statutory classification and that
the decision makers were racially motivated in order to shift the
burden of persuasion to the state.8 4
Although it is conceded that a disproportionate racial effect may be
the best evidence of motivation, it is not the effect but the inference
of motivation which is crucial-this is because the state has no affirmative duty to help blacks but only a duty to be neutral. To discern
motivation, it has been suggested that the court might examine four
factors: "the terms of the law in issue, those effects which must have
been foreseen by the decision makers, the historical context in which
the law was passed, and the legislative history and other recorded
statements of intention."8 5 If the court became convinced of the presence of an impermissible motivation-racial animus, indicating that
race was the criterion of selection-the burden would fall upon the
state to justify the distinction. If the court detected the presence of
other permissible motivations, the impermissible motivation would be
controlling. The sole exception to this rule would operate when the
court could find that only a minority of the decision makers were
motivated by an impermissible criterion. 6
The application of such a motive test to community referenda on
low-income housing site selection in California might prove difficult.
Within the Valtierra context, for example, the four suggested factors
would not have been especially helpful to the plaintiff. First, the terms
of article XXXIV are neutral with respect to race. Second, it would
have been difficult for a court tO make a reasonable decision about
what possible racial effect California voters could have foreseen in
enacting article XXXIV in 1950. Third, the provision was enacted in
response to a state court ruling that California's general, optional
referendum law was not applicable to selections of low-income public
housing sites. Fourth, public statements made at the time of passage
of article XXXIV do not indicate that racial bias played a role in its
83 E.g., Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE
L.J. 1205 (1970).
84 When the new equal protection standard is applicable, the state must demonstrate a
compelling governmental interest to justify the distinction made.
85 Ely, supra note 83, at 1220.
86 Id. at 1268.
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enactment.8 7 Under the proposed motive test, regardless of the results
of the referenda, the provision could not have been found unconstitutional.
The proponent of the motive test does, however, suggest one additional factor-the court can look at the impact of the provision, but
only for the purpose of determining the permissibility of the motivation. Assume that the result is an intolerable one-low-income public
housing is ninety percent black and every site proposed for a white
residential area is vetoed while every site proposed for a black one is
approved.8 8 Assume further that statistics show that a majority of white
voters approved sites in black areas but disfavored sites in white ones.
Before it could possibly make a finding of invalidity, the court must
have found that the white voters, or at least a majority of them, were
motivated by racial animus. Within the context of the hypothetical, an
inference of racial animus would, judged in the light of extensive
research by social scientists, be speculative at best.8 9
87 It is apparent from the appellants' and the appellees' briefs that California voters
were concerned primarily about imposition by the federal government of costs upon particular localities without the consent of their residents. One pamphlet supporting the
passage of article XXXIV stated:
Time after time within the past year, California communities have had public
housing projects forced upon them without regard either to the wishes of the citizens
or community needs. This is a particularly critical matter in view of the fact that
the long-term, multimillion-dollar public housing contracts call for tax waivers and
other forms of local assistance, which the Federal Government says will amount to
half the cost of the federal subsidy on the project as long as it exists.
For government to coerce such additional hidden expense on the voters at a time
when taxation and the cost of living have reached an extreme high is a "gift" of
debatable value. It should be accepted or rejected by ballot ....
...
[A] "yes" vote for this proposed amendment will strengthen local selfgovernment and restore to the community the right to determine its own future
course.

Brief for Appellees at 14-15.
88 This hypothetical is based upon the facts found by the district court in Gautreaux

v. Chicago Housing Authority, 296 F. Supp. 907, 304 F. Supp. 736 (N.D. Ill. 1969), discussed in text at notes 106-08 infra.
89 See A. CAMPBELL, P. CONVERSE, W. MILLER, & D. STOKES, THE AMERICAN VOTER (1960);
A. CAMPBELL, P. CONVERSE, W. MILLER, & D. STOKES, ELErloNS AND THE POLrTCAL ORDER
(1966). In the latter work the authors state: "Typically the line of explication has been
'downward' from the readily visible collective event to the component acts of individuals.
As we have observed, this has led to speculative descriptions of the psychological basis of
individual behavior, of which many have remained wholly untested and some have been
proved by historical events to be untenable." Id. at 5. The authors explain further that
"[the] problem is to identify what this motivation is.... [A]s long as one has only aggregative data at hand one can only speculate as to what moved the individual members of the
collectivity .
I..."
Id. at 2.
While the results and conclusions of survey research analysis presently available can
reliably aid the court in determining motivation, it is doubtful whether the court would
choose to rely on survey research analysis. Courts have not previously measured motivation in this manner and might be reluctant to initiate a precedent of scientific probing
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A second problem arising from adoption of a motive test would be
the determination of the percentage of impermissibly motivated decision makers required in order for a court to invalidate a measure. It
has been suggested that a majority of voters must have had an impermissible motivation. 90 In the hypothetical which has been posed, assume that survey research analysis indicates that thirty percent of the
white voters voted against all proposed sites because they feared higher
taxes, that thirty percent of the white voters voted against proposed
sites in white neighborhoods because they do not like blacks, and that
forty percent of the white voters approved all proposed sites because
they feel sorry for the poor living in substandard housing. The result
is that blacks are completely excluded from white residential neighborhoods. Yet only a minority of voters, albeit a crucial minority, were
motivated by racial animus. 91 Thus, the law would be valid under the
proposed motive test.
One might argue, however, that it is the crucial racially motivated
minority which should be determinative of invalidity-that if the
votes of this minority were necessary to the outcome of the referendum,
as they were in the hypothetical, the referendum provision should be
held invalid; but that if a plurality of the voters would have disapproved
the sites after excluding the racially motivated votes, the referendum
provision should be upheld. While this standard might seem appealing
on first impression, it is subject to the criticisms of ascertainability,
futility, and disutility. 2 Furthermore, courts may fear, with some justification, that a willingness to make an inquiry into voter motivations in
the referendum context by scientific techniques might compel them
to receive such evidence when representative legislation and administrative decisions are challenged as the products of illicit motives.
For several reasons, therefore, the effect test seems to be preferable,
at least in the context of public housing referenda. If it is discriminatory effect which should be controlling, the crucial determination
to have been made in Valtierra was not whether California voters
into people's minds upon every charge of racial discrimination. Furthermore, it is doubtful
whether members of Congress or a state legislature would submit to such an examination
of their motives. To limit scientific testing of motives to laws passed by the people
themselves would perhaps be artificial if it is the surest way to obtain accuracy.
90 Ely, supra note 83, at 1268.
91 Professor Ely, while preferring the motive test in racial discrimination cases, does
not refer in his discussion of Reitman to survey research analysis which concluded that
racial prejudice played a significant part in the passage of Proposition 14. Wolfinger &
Greenstein, The Repeal of Fair Housing in California: An Analysis of Referendum
Voting, 62 Am. POL. SeI. REv. 753 (1968).
-92 See text at notes 79-81 supra.
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were motivated by racial animus in approving article XXXIV in 1950
or in rejecting and approving housing sites since that time, but whether
the provision has actually had a discriminatory effect. To say simply
that there is no racial discrimination in article XXXIV because approval is required for all low-income public housing sites, not just for
those in which blacks will live, does not answer the question whether
the provision, although "neutral on its face," 93 is discriminatory in
effect.
B.

Facially Innocent Criteria
A statute is "neutral on its face" if it makes no express classification
on the basis of an impermissible criterion such as race. It is "fair on
its face and impartial in appearance." 94 The concern is the "'real' basis
of the [classification]"-is it the "facially innocent criterion" it seems
to be, or is it an impermissible criterion?95 To determine validity, the
court must go beyond the face of the statute, examine its effect, and
decide whether or not the "facially innocent criterion" is merely the
"functional equivalent"9 6 of an impermissible criterion.
In the Gomillion decision, for example, the Court invalidated a
redistricting statute whose effect was that of "fencing Negro citizens
out of town."9 7 Residence was the facially innocent criterion which
was found to be the functional equivalent of race, the real basis of a
statute's classification.
In the context of public housing site selection, the question is
whether low income is the functional equivalent of race-whether
passing judgment on public housing on the basis of low income is the
approximate equivalent of passing judgment on the basis of race. It
has been suggested that there are two steps necessary to establish functional equivalence: "a determination that the criterion, like race, has
or is likely to have an adverse differential impact on Negroes" and a
determination that the criterion is no more justifiable as a basis of
classification than is race.98
The district court in Valtierra made both of these determinations,
resting its conclusion upon the theory that low-income public housing
is a functional equivalent of minority group housing. Not only did the
district court find that the criterion had an adverse differential impact
93 402 U.S. at 141.
94 118 U.S. at 373.

95 Fiss, supra note 45, at 297.
96 Id. at 299.
97

564 U.S. at 341.

98 Fiss, sura note 43, at 299.
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9

upon racial minorities, but it-also found that wealth was not a permissible basis of classification. 100 The two criteria of wealth and race seem
inseparable in the Court's opinion.
Although the Supreme Court hinted that article XXXIV might disadvantage some persons, it failed to give more than token acknowledgment to the existence of the wealth criterion on which the provision
is based. Thus, it would have been difficult for it to have made a finding of functional equivalence. In the context of low-income public
housing site selection, however, a court may not be required to make a
determination that the criterion of wealth is no more justifiable than
race in order to find that the two criteria are functionally equivalent. 10 '
This determination of functional equivalence may depend upon two
factors. First, it may be found to exist when the number or proportion
of racial minority group members living in low-income public housing
or on waiting lists reaches such a level that, as a practical matter, lowincome public housing becomes minority group housing. It is difficult
to set a level of minority occupancy which should trigger the conclusion that low-income housing is minority housing. 10 2 The Supreme
Court did suggest a standard in Valtierra, however, when it stated
that "[t]he Article requires referendum approval for any low-rent
public housing project, not only for projects which will be occupied by
a racial minority.' 03 But if all or nearly all low-income housing
projects are occupied, at least in part, by members of racial minority
groups, the prohibited result may have been accomplished, whether
intentionally or not, "by using a criterion which does not mention
-104
race but which accomplishes precisely the same result ....
This standard may, however, be too facile-something more may be
necessary to make a determination of functional equivalence. The court
99 "[T]he impact of the law falls on minorities." 313 F. Supp. at 5.
100 "It is no longer a permissible legislative objective to contain or exclude persons
simply because they are poor." Id. at 4.
101 In Gomnillion the Court found that residence is a permissible redistricting criterion.
Removal of the necessity of finding that that wealth is no more justifiable than race as
a criterion in order to make a determination of functional equivalence represents a
departure from Professor Fiss's theory. See note 43 supra.
102 In Chicago, the locus of Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, 296 F. Supp.
907, 304 F. Supp. 736 (N.D. II. 1969), approximately ninety percent of persons in public
housing or on waiting lists were members of racial minorities. In areas in which the
percentage is not nearly as high, analysis of patterns approval and disapproval in the
referenda may be necessary to determine whether the basis of decision was racial. This is
not to imply that the Court has not previously faced such difficulties. On the contrary, the
achievement of educational integration, a "unitary nonracial school system," poses similar
problems. See Fiss, supra note 69.
103 402 U.S. at 141.
104 Fiss, supra note 43, at 296.
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may then determine whether the-basis of approval of low-income public
housing sites is racial-that is, whether sites are generally approved
when located in areas of minority racial concentration and generally
disapproved when located in white neighborhoods. This does not mean
that motive is relevant. Whatever the motive-racial animosity, concern for property values, or concern about the possibility of higher
taxes-the effect may be that members of racial minority groups are excluded from white residential areas, and from this it may be inferred
that the basis for approval and disapproval is race.
In Valtierra, neither the district court nor the Supreme Court examined the question of the location of housing sites which were approved
and disapproved. The district court did find that "only 52% of the
referenda submitted to voters have been approved"' 0 5 in California,
but its opinion gave no indication that the court examined or compared the racial character of the neighborhoods in which the proposed
sites were approved and disapproved. In Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing
Authority, 0 6 however, in which a federal district court ordered the
Chicago Housing Authority to build most of its future projects in
white neighborhoods, such an examination was made. The court
found that the proposed sites in white neighborhoods were generally
vetoed and that the proposed sites in black neighborhoods were generally approved.
The impact of Valtierraon the validity of the district court's ruling
in Gautreaux is not clear. The cases are similar in many respects. In
both, the local housing authority's selection of a public housing site
was subject to the veto power of an "outside agency." In Gautreaux
the veto was exercised by the alderman of the ward in which the
proposed site was located, while in Valtierra it was exercised by the
community in which the proposed site was located. In Gautreaux the
court found no evidence that either the housing authority or the
alderman was motivated by racial animus. 10 7 Regardless of motive, the
effect of the site selection procedure was racially discriminatory: "[N]o
criterion, other than race, [could] plausibly explain the veto of over
991/% of the housing units located on the white sites . . . and at the
105 313 F. Supp. at 3.
106 296 F. Supp. 907, 304 F. Supp. 736 (N.D. Il. 1969).
107 Defendants urge that [Chicago Housing Authority) officials never entertained racist
attitudes and that the racial character of the neighborhood has never been a factor
in CHA's selection of a suitable site. . . . [T]hese statements are undoubtedly true.
It is also true that there is no evidence that the Aldermen who vetoed the white
sites were necessarily motivated by racial animus when they followed a policy of
keeping Negroes out of white neighborhoods.
296 F. Supp. at 914.
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same- time the rejection of only -10% or so -of the units on Negro
sites."10 8 This showing was sufficient to bring the aldermanic veto
within the prohibition of the equal protection clause.
If these same Chicago communities were to adopt a mandatory
referendum on low-income public housing site selection and the same
pattern of approval and disapproval of proposed sites were to emerge,
there is little doubt that the Gautreaux court would invalidate the
referendum procedure-it would not permit communities to achieve
the same result through the ballot box which was constitutionally impermissible when accomplished by an aldermanic veto. Thus, the
crucial difference between Valtierra and Gautreaux may be merely
evidentiary-the proof of effect of the site approval procedure. If the
Valtierra Court was unconvinced by the district court's finding of a
racially discriminatory effect, the best procedure may have been to
simply remand for trial on the merits, where additional facts could
have been introduced.
C.

Reitman, Hunter, and Valtierra-AreThey Consistent?

The foregoing analysis does not, of course, explain the Supreme
Court's disregard of the lower court's findings of racial discrimination,
which, according to Reitman, are entitled to great weight. It is thus
reasonable to inquire whether Reitman, although not mentioned by
the Court, was implicitly overruled.
The lower court in Valtierra found that "[h]ere, as in the Hunter
case, the impact of the law falls upon minorities."' 0 9 The Supreme
Court summarily dismissed this finding.110 Such a modus operandi is
contrary to that employed by the Court in Reitman. In that case
Proposition 14, an initiative constitutional amendment neutral on its
face, had been approved in a statewide referendum by nearly a two-toone margin. The amendment repealed state legislation prohibiting
housing discrimination and required that further legislation on the
subject be approved in a statewide referendum. In rejecting the petitioners' contention that the amendment was neutral with respect to
race, Justice White, writing for the Court, stated that because the
Court had been given no persuasive evidence to the contrary, the
108 Id. at 912.
109 313 F. Supp. at 5.
11o After noting that the district court had chiefly relied on the Hunter case, the
Court stated: "The Court below erred in relying on Hunter to invalidate Article XXXiv.
Unlike the case before us, Hunter rested on the conclusion that Akron's referendum law
denied equal protection by placing 'special burdens on racial minorities within the

governmental process."' 402 U.S. at 140.
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California Supreme Court's belief that the provision would "significantly encourage and involve the State in private discriminations"

would control."'
Although the lower court in Valtierra made no finding of "encouragement,"11 2 apparently the Supreme Court gave no weight to the
lower court's finding that the referendum provision would impose a
special burden on racial minorities-the constitutional standard for
invalidity established in Hunter v. Erickson.113 There a referendum

ordinance was passed "amending the city charter to prevent the city
council from implementing any ordinance dealing with racial, religious,
or ancestral discrimination in housing without approval of the majority
of the voters of [the city]." 1 4 The city argued that the challenged provision was valid under Reitman because no finding of "encouragement"
had been made by the lower court. The Supreme Court dismissed the

argument:
Here, unlike Reitman, there was an explicitly racial classification
treating racial housing matters differently from other racial and
other housing matters ...
... Moreover, although the law on its face treats Negro and
Il1

387 US. at 381. The somewhat inscrutable opinion of the Court in Reitman has

perhaps been most accurately characterized as a "pas de deux with the California high
court." Sager, supra note 20, at 790. Justice Harlan, dissenting in Reitman, argued that
the Court's decision was premised upon the assumption that the neutrality of the amendment was a sham, and that "[i]n depicting the provision as tantamount to active State
encouragement of discrimination the Court essentially relies on the fact that the California
Supreme Court so concluded." 387 U.S. at 389-90. Reitman has meant a number of different things to a number of different persons. See, e.g., Black, supra note 20, at 82:
The rule which I would propose, then, as a basis for the Reitman decision, is that
where a racial group is in a political duel with those who would explicitly discriminate against it as a racial group, and where the regulatory action the racial
group wants is of full and undoubted federal constitutionality, the state may not
place in the way of the racial minority's attaining its political goal any barriers
which, within the state's political system taken as a whole, are especially difficult
of surmounting, by comparison with those barriers that normally stand in the
way of those who wish to use the political processes to get what they want.
According to Karst & Horowitz, supra note 20, at 51, the Court's opinion "makes dear
that it decided the case on the basis of the state's involvement in racial discrimination,
and not because of any structural limitation on Negroes' ability to make their influence
felt."
112 The meaning of "encouragement" in the Court's opinion is somewhat ambiguous.

However, it is perhaps most consistent with the Court's prior opinions, see, e.g., United
States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), discussed in text at note 73 supra, to adopt the
view of Karst & Horowitz, supra note 20, at 47: "[To the extent that the California
Court did hold that Proposition 14 was an encouragement of private discrimination, it
plainly did so, not by reading a declaration of purpose into the text of Proposition 14,
but by measuring the conceded effect of the amendment....
218 393 U.S. 385 (1969).
114 Id. at 386.
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white, Jew and gentile in an identical manner, the reality is that
the law's impact falls on the minority. The majority needs no protection against discrimination and if it did, a referendum might
be bothersome but no more than that . .

.

. [The ordinance]

places special burdens on racial minorities within the governmental process. This is no more permissible than denying them
the vote, on an equal basis with others. 1 5
The Court concluded that "the State may no more disadvantage any
particular group by making it more difficult to enact legislation in its
behalf than it may dilute any person's vote or give any group a smaller
representation than another of comparable size.""16 It is clear that such
a special burden might fall on minority groups whether or not an
explicit classification is made. The principle of a statute "neutral on
its face" gives express recognition to that possibility. This was the
finding of the lower court in Valtierra.
It may be possible to distinguish Reitman and Hunter from
Valtierra on the ground that the provisions in the former cases repealed
substantive rights while the provision in the latter did not. However,
several factors preclude such an easy distinction. First, the Supreme
Court has never held that states have an obligation to pass fair housing
laws. Thus, it can be said that after the passage of Proposition 14 in
Reitman the state of California assumed the same position with respect
to housing discrimination as states which had never passed fair housing
legislation at all. Second, immediately preceding the Hunter decision,
the Civil Rights Act of 196811 had been enacted and Jones v. Mayer,118
prohibiting private housing discrimination, had been decided. Either
the Act or the Jones decision would presumably have given a remedy
to the Hunter plaintiff. However, the Court dismissed the city's argument that the case had been rendered moot by these events. Third,
because public housing projects are probably composed of a racially
heterogeneous population, it is difficult to determine whether fair
housing laws with respect to these occupants or potential occupants
have been repealed by article XXXIV.
It is difficult to reconcile Valtierra with Reitman and Hunter, especially since Reitman was not mentioned in the Valtierra opinions. It is
possible, however, to suggest one theory which would permit these
cases to be interpreted in a consistent manner: If a statute is neutral on
115 Id. at 389, 591 (emphasis added).
116 Id. at 393.
11T Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73 (1968).
118 392 US. 409 (1968).
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its face and the lower court finds that it will "encourage'' racial discrimination, the Supreme Court will give great weight to this determination and affirm unless persuasive evidence to the contrary is
offered."19 If a statute, although treating racial minorities and whites
alike on its face, makes an explicitly racial classification whose impact
falls upon minorities by imposing special burdens within the governmental process, the Court will invalidate it without requiring a determination of "encouragement" by the lower court.120 If, however, a
statute is neutral on its face and the lower court makes a determination
that the impact of the law falls upon racial minorities, the Supreme
Court will give no weight to the lower court's determination. The
matter would thus seem to be one of employing the correct key wordif the statute is neutral, the lower court should use "encouragement"
language; if the statute makes an explicitly racial classification, although treating everyone alike, the lower court should use "special
burden" language. This theory is supported by the Court's language in
21
Palmerv. Thompson:'
Petitioners also claim that Jackson's closing of the public pools
authorizes or encourages private pool owners to discriminate on
account of race and that such "encouragement" is prohibited by
Reitman v. Mulkey . . ..
. . . This Court there accepted what it designated as the holding of the Supreme Court of California ....
In the first place there are no findings here about any state
"encouragement" of discrimination, and it is not clear that any
122
such theory was ever considered by the District Court.
The Supreme Court seems to have implied that had the lower court
made a finding of "encouragement" with respect to Jackson's neutral
act of closing its pools, a different question would have been presented.
Both the elements of "encouragement" and "special burden" were
23
arguably present in both Reitman and Hunteras well as in Valtierra.1
If the explanation offered for reconciling the cases seems strained,
"19

387 U.S. 369 (1967).

120 393 U.S. 385 (1969).
121 403 U.S. 217 (1971).
122 Id. at 223.
123 Proposition 14 clearly imposed "a special burden" upon minorities seeking to pass
fair housing legislation. The effect of repealing the fair housing ordinance in Hunter and
prohibiting the enactment of future fair housing legislation except by referendum would

arguably "encourage" discrimination within the meaning of Reitman, although the
Hunter court chose not to rely upon the "encouragement" standard in favor of the more
traditional equal protection approach of increased procedural burden.
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perhaps the only alternative explanation is that they cannot be read
24
together and that Valtierraimplicitly overruled Reitman.1
CONCLUSION

The result reached by the Valtierra Court is satisfying because in an
era of growing federal bureaucracy it leaves to popular resolution a
decision which may vitally affect local communities. Yet the decision
is also unsatisfying because it exacerbates the isolation of the poorespecially the minority group poor long subjected to discrimination
because of race-within the inner city. In sum, Valtierra may be more
important for what it failed to say than for what it did say and do. For
by ignoring the important questions raised by the plaintiff with respect
to evolving doctrines of the equal protection clause, the Court may
have signaled a retreat from its formerly expansive interpretations of
the fourteenth amendment.
Donna M. Murasky
124 Another approach is, of course, to limit Reitman or Valtierra to its specific factsto say that constitutional principles apparently enunciated in either case have no
application to any other case.

